Laos: Search For Peace in the Midst of War by Langer, Paul F. (Author)
\ 
LAOS: SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDST OF WAR 
Paul F. Langer 
December 1967 
P-3748 
LAOS; SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDST OF WAR 
Paul F. Langer* 
The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California 
As Laos entered'1967, the picture looked very bleak. 
In theory, the strategically important country had been 
neutralized and sealed against foreign intervention by the 
Geneva Accords of 1962. The three feuding political fac-
tions — "rightists," "neutralists," and Communist-led 
Neo Laos Hak Sat (commonly called the Pathet Lao) — had 
agreed to make peace with each other and to rule jointly 
the country through a govertiment of national union. Unfor-
tunately for the Laotian people, the practice was another 
matter. 
In Vientiane, the administrative capital on the Mekong, 
neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma remained at the helm, but 
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at cabinet meetings the chairs reserved for the Pathet Lao 
representatives stood empty. The Prime Minister was pre-
siding over a nimp government and his authority extended 
only to a part of the country. In 1963, Souvanna's half-
brother, Prince Souphanouvong, the nominal leader of the 
NLHS, had withdrawn with his friends into the western 
regions of the country. From there, with their back 
against North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao were carrying on 
a guerrilla-style "war of national liberation" against 
the Vientiane government. In this they had the full 
backing of the North Vietnamese who provided generous 
support to their Lao allies including a sizable number 
of armed forces. 
To make matters worse, the previous year had been one 
of disasters and crises: a catastrophic flood had ruined 
much of the rice crop; the Prime Minister and the National 0 
Assembly had clashed head-on so that the parliament had to 
t 
be dissolved and new elections called to break the dead-
lock; finally, ex-strongman General Phoumi Nosavan was I 
plotting a comeback from his exile in Thailand while 
General Kong Le was engaged in a losing struggle to retain 
control over his neutralist forces and air force General 
Thao Ma was dropping bombs on his enemies in Vientiane's 
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mllltary headquarters. There was also fear that the esca* 
lating conflict in neighboring Vietnam might eventually 
engulf all of Laos. To the north. Communist China in the 
throes of its Cultural Revolution posed another question 
mark. 
But Laos came through 1967 remarkably well. As 
Prince Souvanna Phouma returned from a tour of Western 
capitals toward the end of the year, he could be reason-
ably satisfied. His political position had been consoli-
dated. Not a single attempt had been made during the year 
to overthrow his government through military force. The 
threat of famine had been averted. And, the military 
balance of power in the country was if anything favoring 
the non-Communist side. ' 
In January 1967, some 600,000 voters (out of a total 
estimated population of 2.3 million under government con-
trol) went to the polls. As anticipated, the new National 
Assembly reflected more faithfully than its predecessor the 
real power and influence of the coalition made up of the 
Prime Minister,most of the country's leading families, and 
* 
the major military leaders in Vientiane and the four other 
regions #> 
-4-
But in 1967, Souvanna — very much the French-educated 
aristocrat -- continued to lack, unlike other Lao politi-
cians, a solid regional power base or genuine mass support. 
His position of leadership was owed essentially to the fact 
that he had long been known as the leading proponent of a 
neutralist policy for his country. This policy was accorded 
international blessing by the Geneva agreements, the gen-
eral lines of which both the United States and the Soviet 
Union wish to preserve in Laos. 
Another source of strength for Souvanna is his capacity 
for accommodating himself to the realities of Lao politics, 
above all the continued existence of a pronounced regional 
power pattern and the important role a few prominent families 
play in it. Their interests must be considered and implicitly 
acknowledged in the selection of National Assemblymen, in 
the make-up of the cabinet, and in dividing the spoils of 
civilian and military office. 
Having consolidated his political position and forged 
an alliance with certain influential families (especially 
the Sananikones of Vientiane), Souvanna, in 1967 set about 
the task of giving his country a more efficient government 
and gfeater national^ cohesion. He opened up access to the 
levers of command to a few able men in their forties who 
T 
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had been restless for some time and tended, barred from 
positions of responsibility, to become nuclei of anti-
government agitation. Without touching the tripartite 
arrangements regarding the distribution of ministerial 
portfolios among the three factions, the Prime Minister 
injected new blood into those positions immediately below 
those of ministerial rank. Hiese new appointees were 
finding a kindred spirit in a hold-over from Souvanna's 
previous cabinet, Sisouk n Champassak, a young, well-
trained and most able cabinet minister concerned with 
economic and financial policies. 
A member of the prestigious and most powerful southern 
family which is headed by Prince Boun Oum, leader of the 
•'rightist faction," Sisouk is by definition classified in 
the tripartite nomenclature of Laos as a "rightist." But 
in the past few years, these political labels have begun 
to lose significance as the dividing line between the two 
non-Communist factions has become increasingly blurred 
with acceptance by both parties of the implications of 
Laos* international[position. This process made rapid 
progress in 1967 as important figures with strong person-
alities disappeared from the political scene or lost 
influence. General Kong Le, once the charismatic young 
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leader of the neutralist forces, was compelled by his own 
men to resign and went to Paris to lead the life of an 
exile. The rightwing contender for power General Phoumi 
I 
Nosavan was forced to remain in exile in Thailand and saw 
his hopes for a successful political comeback fade away 
as time went by. 
Not altogether without justification has Laos been 
called "a state by diplomatic courtesy." Certainly it is 
premature to speak of effective Lao nationalism or Lao 
national consciousness. Divisive forces and conditions 
continue to prevail in Laos: traditional regionalism and 
vested local interests; the mountainous topography of the 
country and the undeveloped, largely autarkic state of its 
village economy; the near total absence of means of trans-
portation and communications in most rural areas of Laos; 
the presence of a variety of mutually antagonistic (or at 
best indifferent) ethnic minorities united only in their 
suspicion of the ruling lowland Lao; and, the obstacles 
posed to a real unification of the country by continuing 
lack of security due to the war. 
Nevertheless, Souvanna in 1967 renewed his attempts 
to promote national integration and cohesion through 
economic development, education, and administrative 
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measures. An important role in this task was also played 
by government efforts to build up the Luang Prabang royal 
4 
house as a symbol of national unity. In January, the 
Crown Prince visited the Nam Bac area — a fertile valley 
some.60 miles west of Dienbienphu and only recently recap-
tured from the Pathet Lao -- to show himself to the popula-
tion. This was only the first of a number of royal tours 
which in 1967 gave many Lao their first chance to see their 
future king and to become conscious of %eing a Lao." 
During the past year, Laos successfully overcame the 
disastrous damage of the 1966 flood and even managed to 
make some modest economic advances despite the civil war. 
This was due partly to the Lao government's own efforts 
to Introduce budgetary controls and planning in a country 
idiere both had been virtually unheard of; to improve tax 
collection; to increase the efficiency of the customs 
service; and to reduce the graft and corruption for which 
Laos had become famous in the 1950's. Symbolic of this 
effort to enhance the role of the financial administration 
was the rise of an impressive building on Vientiane's 
Embassy Row. This was the new Ministry of Finance re-
placing the dingy quarters hitherto occupied by Sisouk*s 
modest staff. 
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But under conditions currently prevailing in wartom 
Laos^ local initiative can only make a very limited contri-
bution to economic development. The country's per capita 
GNP is estimated at $60 thus placing it at the bottom of 
the Asian income ladder^ right below Nepal. Two thirds of 
the Lao budget currently goes to the support of the armed 
forces (numbering 70-80,000 men) whom the country's under-
developed economy cannot possibly support out of its own 
resources. Since only one third of the national budget of 
Laos is now covered by ordinary revenues, international aid 
programs play a vital role in keeping Laos alive. Among 
these, the U.S. aid program is by far the most significant 
accounting for some 80% of all international assistance to 
Laos. 
? 
As in previous years, this U.S. aid program provided 
in 1967 the necessary funds for the struggle against the 
Pathet Lao and their Vietnamese allies, for resettlement 
and rehabilitation of the vast army of refugees from the 
war (averaging 250,000 at any one time) as well as for 
economic developments The overall size of the U.S. aid 
(effort in Laos remained roughly at the level of the pre-
vious year — about $55-60 million plus an unspecified 
amount going to military purposes. These aid efforts were 
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for the most part directed toward three areas: agriculture, 
education, and road construction. Allocation of these 
American resources was guided in most cases as much by 
the objective of attaining political-social cohesion and 
reinforcing internal security as by considerations of 
economic development. 
This was best illustrated by the so-called Sedone 
Valley program which reached its full capacity in 1967. 
The program spans portions of three provinces in Southern 
Laos. All U.S.-sponsored projects (schools, road construc-
tion, agricultural development, etc.) are coordinated with 
the Lao military efforts to remove Pathet Lao influence 
from the area inhabited by some 140,000 people. It was 
officially estimated that by the spring of the year almost 
two thirds of the population had been returned toj government 
control. 
Thanks to the influx of American aid, Laos in 1967 
continued to make headway in the hitherto much neglected 
field of education. A new elementary school opened vir-
tually every day somewhere in the country not excepting 
the tribal areas where the literacy rate is particularly 
low and illiteracy among adults is often close to 1007.. 
1967 constituted something of a landmark in Lao education: 
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an American-financed secondary school got underway in 
Vientiane. Here, for the first time in the country's 
history, most of the instruction will be offered in the 
Lao language rather than in the traditional French. 
A U.S.-funded road-building program has obviously 
both implications for the development of a market economy 
and for the improvement of internal security. At the same 
time, it is hoped that it will eventually permit a drastic 
reduction of expenditures (irunning in excess of $10 million 
per year) for air support of aid and relief operations in 
Laos. In 1967 substantial progress was made toward the 
completion of a north-south highway which, security per-
mitting, will allow truck traffic all the way from Luang 
Prabang to the Cambodian border. 
Economic progress during 1967 was particularly striking 
in the major towns along the Mekong, especially in Vientiane 
where traffic lights were being installed as Japanese-made 
motorcycles were beginning to pose a traffic problem. But 
even in the rural areas there were clear indications of the 
impact of the aid program: an increasing number of hamlets 
; I 
were benefiting from the completion of feeder roads and 
makeshift buses began to carry their human cargo and agri-
t 
cultural produce to the market ccnters^ 
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Little by little Laos is also ^tering the mainstream 
of Asian life through commodity exchanges and participation 
in regional organizations. In 1967, tourists coming up by 
plane from Bangkok were vying for space at the Lane Xang 
Hotel with members of the international Mekong Development 
Committee and a variety of international survey teams. The 
cornerstone was being laid for the first major power project 
in Laos, the internationally-financed $24 million Nam Ngum 
Dam. Talks about a bridge and power lines linking Vientiane 
with Thailand across the Mekong River were entering the dis-
cussion it age. Another memorable event occurred in October 
of 1967: for the first time a resident of Vientiane eould 
pick up the phone to call Luang Prabang or Savannakhet and 
even a number of cities in Thailand. Once isolated Laos is 
now rapidly emerging into the m o d e m world. 
No striking change in the military situation in Laos 
occurred during 1967. The Pathet Lao and their North 
Vietnamese sponsors continued to hold almost half of the 
country's territory, mostly a broad belt of mountainous 
terrain along the border of the two Vietnams. But they 
controlled no more than 20% of the total population of 
the country and these were for the most part tribal people. 
Even within underdeveloped Laos, the region held by the 
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Pathet Lao is a particularly poor and undeveloped one. 
Hence the Pathet Lao were dependent on North Vietnamese 
assistance even more than their opponents were on help 
from the United States. 
During the year, the Lao government maintained with-
out much difficulty its power base in the more developed 
lowlands along the Mekong. Only occasionally did the 
Pathet Lao interfere with road traffic or ambush isolated 
posts. On the other hand, no place was absolutely safe 
from attack: even the Luang Prabang airfield was hit 
twice in the same year each time suffering the loss of 
« 
some ten planes — a substantial portion of the small 
Royal Lao air force. 
On the whole, the FAR (Forces Armees Royales) did 
rather well in 1967 showing the effect of improved training 
and better coordination. They successfully cleaned out I 
minor pockets of Pathet Lao resistance, withstood almost 
daily attacks by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese units 
trying to recapture the valuable Nam Bac valley north of 
Luang Prabang. In the north, also, Meo General Vang Pao's 
guerrilla forces continued to harass the enemy. In the 
south. General Phasouk successfully compressed the Pathet 
Lao positions in the Lao Ngam area \diere they had been 
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entrenched for the last 17 years. But neither side was 
strong enough or willing to take the risk of attacking the 
enemy's major positions: this applied especially to the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail area where North Vietnamese units rather 
,than Pathet Lao forces had responsibility for defense. 
Even if no major-battles were fought in Laos during 
1967, the fighting there was bloodier than the absence of 
news about it in the international press would suggest. 
About'4% ef the population (corresponding to 8 million men 
under U.S. conditions) were under arms and according to 
the Prime Minister's estimate casualties were running as 
high as 7,000 men per year — a rate that would translate 
into half a million casualties on a U.S. population basis. 
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese prisoners and defectors 
during 1967 confirmed the important role the North Vietnamese 
had come to play in maintaining a high level of insurgency 
in Laos. Not surprisingly, relations between the Vientiane 
government and Hanoi (which continued to recognize Souvanna's 
4 
government rather than the Pathet Lao although it also main-
tained, as did China, a mission in NLHS territory at Khang 
' Khay) went from bad to worse in 1967. This was in fact the 
major international development affecting Laos during that 
year. 
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Early in 1967, Souvanna Phouma had'publicly attacked 
the North Vietnamese for interfering with armed forces in 
his coimtry's affairs and he had drawn attention to the 
presence of 30,000 North Vietnamese combat troops on Laos 
soil. In September he announced that his Ambassador's 
t 
mission in Hanoi had come to an end. Then, on October 13, 
speaking before the United Nations Souvanna drew the 
world's attention once more to the fact of North Vietnamese 
intervention. On that same day, in Vientiane, the Lao 
government put on display at a press conference a number 
of North Vietnamese prisoners and defectors who had 
rallied in Laos. Later on, while visiting Australia, he 
referred once more to the troubled situation in Laos and 
spoke of the areas under NLHS control as of a "new type of 
colony of North Vietnam." 
While thus bringing maximum pressure to bear on 
Hanoi to withdraw its forces from Lao territory, Souv&nna 
remained faithful to his long-standing strategy of strength-
ening his position against outside intervention by main-
tainiifg the best possible relations with all other nations. 
Thus, during 1967, Souvanna not only cultivated the Soviet 
Union and the United States, he also sought to remain on 
cordial temw with the Chinese Communists and all his other 
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'nttlghbors. On the other hand, he did everything in his 
power to reduce the chances of war spilling over into Laos 
* 
and turning the entire country — rather than part of it --
into a battlefield. Thus when asked in Canberra about his 
reaction to the idea of extending a barrier through Vietnam 
into Laos, he rejected this suggestion as detrimental to 
his country's interests for, in his view, such a line 
would tend tq encourage a widening of the war. "If we 
now have war in Laos," he stated, "it is at least a war 
which remains limited to certain regions." 
In 1967, Souvanna's diplomacy had been unable to free 
his country from Hanoi's forces. As the war in Vietnam 
» 
increased in scope and violence, it seemed doubtful whether 
• in 1968 he would even be able to preserve that modicum of 
peace Laos had been enjoying during the previous year. 
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